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difference between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese ways of displaying aggres-
sion when discussing cross-Strait issues. While the Taiwanese use abusive terms
in order to dissociate themselves from the Mainland Chinese, the latter tend to
associate themselves with Taiwanese through terms that subsume Taiwanese
claims to a national identity within a broader pan-Chinese identity, thereby
implicitly displaying a social claim of sovereignty and cultural supremacy over
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1 Introduction
The study of verbal aggression has in recent years has garnered increasing
attention in the rapidly growing field of impoliteness research. However, this
interest in aggression, rudeness and other impoliteness-related areas has, fol-
lowing the general trend in politeness research, centred primarily on its occur-
rence in interpersonal interaction (Bousfield 2008; Bousfield & Locher 2008;
Culpeper 1996, 2011). The study of verbal aggression or perceived impoliteness
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in the context of intergroup relations, in contrast, has received less attention.
The move to studying impoliteness in various forms of computer-mediated com-
munication (CMC) offers the opportunity to start addressing this imbalance.
Online discussion boards, for instance, can provide a very large corpus of inter-
actions spread across large networks of users that enable researchers to exam-
ine verbal aggression not only at an interpersonal but also an intergroup level
of analysis. In order to examine the implications of verbal aggression and per-
ceptions of impoliteness for intergroup relations, however, the traditional theo-
risation of face as a positive self-image attributed to individuals (Goffman 1967;
Brown & Levinson 1987) needs to be complemented by a conceptualisation of
face that is extensible to groups. Such a collective notion of face need not
assume an essentialistic view of group identity, but instead can build on a
discursive conceptualisation of identity as produced, enacted or performed in
discourse (Blommaert 2005; Bucholtz 1999; Butler 1990). The value of examin-
ing perceptions of collective identities through the prism of face is that it high-
lights the crucial importance of recognition of such perceptions by others in
intergroup contexts.
Online nationalistic discourse in and between groups of Mainland Chinese
and Taiwanese offers a useful window into verbal aggression (and other aspects
of) impoliteness in an intergroup context. There are long-term political strains
between China and Taiwan: the Chinese Communist Party claims Taiwan is a
part of China, while the Taiwanese reject this stance (Cole 2006). Due to this,
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese online interactions can become hostile when
the two sides interact or if they discuss issues relating to national identity. In
direct Sino-Taiwanese interactions even seemingly small issues such as the use
of simplified or traditional Chinese characters (the former preferred in China
and the latter in Taiwan) can lead to the outbreak of acrimonious debates. Such
debates are arguably connected to the broader discourse on Chinese national-
ism that surfaces, for instance, in the media in both countries (Gries 1999;
Gries & Peng 2002; Kuo 2002, 2003).1
A focus on Chinese verbal aggression and impoliteness in intergroup con-
texts also addresses somewhat of a gap in the field: although some studies have
touched on aggression, rudeness and other impoliteness-related areas (Kádár
2012; Pan 2000; Pan & Kádár 2011), impoliteness in Chinese is still considerably
underrepresented in the literature, compared with politeness issues. Studies on
1 We are not claiming here that Sino-Taiwanese interactions on discussion boards are inher-
ently hostile. While studying this issue is beyond the scope of the present study, cases can be
found when various Chinese and Taiwanese groups make use of a ‘pan-Chinese’ national face
in order to position themselves as ‘allies’, for instance.
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relational work in CMC also reflect this imbalance: while various forms of CMC
offer potentially massive datasets to examine conflict, rudeness, aggression and
other phenomena associated with impoliteness, the few studies devoted to Chi-
nese CMC have dealt predominantly with politeness (Chen 2009; Lu 2010), and
other related phenomena (Su 2009; Wang 2009).
In this study, we examine manifestations of verbal aggression between Chi-
nese and Taiwanese in computer-mediated communication (CMC) discussion
boards. More specifically, we examine the role of perceptions of national iden-
tity and national face in occasioning instances of aggression in this particular
intergroup context. While we argue that perceived threats to national face can
occasion instances of verbal aggression, we propose that national face is of a
different order of ontological reality compared to that of face in interpersonal
interactions. National face arises, we will suggest, through the dynamic inter-
section of micro, interactional concerns with macro, sociohistorical discourses
about national identity, where the latter are what give rise to the expectations
that can play a constitutive role in interaction (Haugh 2009). In other words,
we are not claiming that national face arises through interaction per se, but
rather that perceptions of national face, and expectations that it be recognised
by others, play a critical role in the interpretative and recipient design processes
in micro-interactions between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, including in
the deployment and interpretation of aggression.
More concretely we will argue that there is a fundamental difference
between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese ways of displaying aggression when
discussing cross-Strait issues. As we will show, the Taiwanese tend to use con-
siderably more abusive terms of address/forms of reference with regard to Main-
land Chinese than vice versa. This raises the question as to what the Mainland
Chinese users might do instead of using such abusive forms in online interac-
tions, since we have no reason or evidence to believe that Mainland Chinese
are more likely to avoid conflict than their Taiwanese counterparts. As closer
analysis shows, the answer resides in their respective use of referential terms,
which represent different, competing orientations to perceived national face. We
analyse these different orientations primarily by building on Bucholtz’s (1999)
framework of discursive association and dissociation in identity formation.
A comparative study of Taiwanese and Chinese online behaviours raises an
important empirical question, however, namely whether the practice of internet
censorship prevalent in Mainland China decreases the relative amount of Tai-
wan-related discourse. As Zittrain & Edelman (2003) have argued, among oth-
ers, the Chinese government blocks various top Taiwanese websites. This means
that Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese often have no opportunities to interact
directly on political issues, and so some of this aggressive discourse takes place
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in intracultural dialogues. Yet, as our paper will show, there have recently been
an increasing number of Mainland Chinese CMC discussion boards which allow
open access to Taiwanese users, and also there are cases where Taiwanese and
Mainland Chinese encounter each other and start aggressive debates spontane-
ously in uncontrolled international online gaming websites.
In this paper, we begin by discussing the clash between Mainland Chinese
and Taiwanese claims to national identity, and outlining how a notion of per-
ceived national face can be usefully deployed in analysing online verbal aggres-
sion in intergroup contexts. We next briefly outline our data sources and meth-
odological approaches before introducing the results of quantitative lexical
research into the use of referential terms, including, in particular, abusive terms
in online discourse. We then attempt to account for the asymmetry in the
deployment of abusive terms by Taiwanese compared to Mainland Chinese
through close analyses of micro-interactions between Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese in online discussion boards. We conclude by briefly outlining the
implications of our findings for studies of identity and face in intergroup set-
tings.
2 Identity and national face in Mainland Chinese
and Taiwanese CMC interactions
The issue of national identity in cross-Strait relations between Mainland China
and Taiwan remains both highly sensitive and increasingly disputed (Chu & Lin
2001; Dittmer 2004; Hsu 2010; Huang 2009). While the official position in Main-
land China is that Taiwan is a renegade province of China, many citizens of
Taiwan no longer consider themselves to be (exclusively) Chinese. According to
a recent poll conducted in 2008 by TVBS (a television broadcaster in Taiwan),
45 percent of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, 45 percentage
identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, with there being only
a very small minority of Taiwanese (4 percent) who identified themselves as
exclusively Chinese.2 As far as we are aware, no similar poll has been conducted
in Mainland China because Western-type census research does not currently
occur under the authoritarian Chinese system (Pan 2013). However, considering
the pivotal role of ideological-political education in the socialisation of Chinese
youth (Arai 2011), and the prevalence of discourse on Mainland Chinese and
2 http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/even/200806/even-20080610175239.pdf (cf. http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwanese_identity).
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Taiwanese unity in the Chinese educational system, it seems to be logical to
assume that a fair proportion of the Chinese population considers the Tai-
wanese to be Chinese. While no society is unanimous in its political discourse,
which can also be seen from the fact that cross-Strait discourses are not neces-
sarily always hostile, it is clear that differences in national identity claims by
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese users are likely to surface in CMC discussion
boards.
While CMC was initially seen as an impersonal and impoverished form of
communication, in recent years there has been an important shift towards a
discursive perspective on interpersonal dimensions of CMC, where identities are
treated by analysts as performed and transient (Georgakopoulou 2006: 548),
and evaluations of im/politeness are seen as arising locally in interactions
within the context of communities of practice (Graham 2007), or latent/emer-
gent networks (Locher 2006). The discursive shift in CMC research entails a
shift away from researchers coding forms and strategies as straightforward
instances of politeness or claims about particular identities, to an analytical
focus on ‘expectations and norms about what is licensed, encouraged or prohib-
ited’, on the one hand, and what ‘social actions and practices [participants] are
engaged in and their own evaluations of them’, on the other (Georgakopoulou
2006: 552). However, while the discursive approach to im/politeness and iden-
tity accounts for variability in norms and interactional practices across online
communities, the focus of research thus far has been primarily on relational
work at the interpersonal level. It thus generally builds on an approach to iden-
tity and face rooted in the individual (Locher 2008), or relationships between
individuals (Haugh, Chang & Kádár forthcoming). However, in studying conflict
between identities at an intergroup level, which involve issues of national iden-
tity, current approaches to face cannot be straightforwardly deployed. An
approach that complements the focus on the identity and face of individuals
with an account of collective identities and face is arguably required.
With regard to the analysis of collective identity, specifically, national iden-
tity, we take a broadly discursive perspective on national identity construction
(De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak 1999), although we prefer to treat national identities
as perceived rather than imagined for the simple reason that perceptions of
national identity held by individuals can nevertheless play a constitutive role in
interaction. In analysing the differences in national identity claims by Mainland
Chinese and Taiwanese CMC users we draw initially from Bucholtz’s (1999)
aforementioned concepts of association and dissociation. Associative identity
practices involve indexing pan-identity claims. In Sino-Taiwanese interactions
this pattern was found to be preferred by many Mainland Chinese, who com-
monly claimed or assumed that Taiwanese are Chinese. Dissociative identity
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practices involve distancing oneself from members of another nation. In our
data this practice was more common amongst the Taiwanese users, who
claimed a Taiwanese national identity independent to that of Mainland Chinese.
However, it was found that differential national identity claims could not
readily explain why the Taiwanese users displayed overt and covert forms of
verbal aggression, while the Mainland Chinese users apparently did not. We
thus turned to the notion of face, hypothesising that what occasioned displays
of verbal aggression was the expectation that the claims of Taiwanese to a
national identity independent of Mainland China should be recognised. When
these claims were not recognised, this was interpreted as a threat to the
national face of Taiwanese. In invoking recognition of identity claims by others,
then, we suggest that national identity claims are not only discursively con-
structed or disputed in interaction, but engender certain expectations amongst
interactants. These expectations concerning recognition of national identity
claims by others is what moves our analysis beyond a singular focus on identity
to a consideration of face as well.
It has been noted that members of a particular ethnic group are often con-
cerned about how members of other groups view them in general in intergroup
contexts (Hahn & Hatfield 2011; Nwoye 1992; Sifianou 2011; Spencer-Oatey &
Xing 2000). The notion of ‘group face’ has thus been proposed to account for
face sensitivities about groups to which individuals belong, ranging from
smaller relational networks, such as families or workplaces, through to large
one, such as ethnicities and nationalities (Spencer-Oatey 2005). While group
face has often been theorised as ‘self-aspects of a person’s identity that are
derived from membership in a collective or group, and not ... the identity of a
group as a sui generis entity’ (Spencer-Oatey 2005: 106–107), or concern by
individuals for group interests and norms (Nwoye 1992: 313), we propose that
in some instances a perceived group face goes beyond having implications for
just the individuals who comprise that group. Morisaki & Gudykunst (1994: 73),
for example, claim that group face may be perceived as existing as a phenom-
ena in its own right rather than being parasitic on ‘individual face’ in ‘inter-
group situations where there is an ongoing relationships [sic] between the
groups involved’. In a number of East Asian societies, for instance, it is com-
monly assumed that ‘family face’ or ‘company face’ exists as an interactional
concern alongside the faces of the individual members of that family or com-
pany (Hahn & Hatfield 2011; Haugh 2005), which builds, in turn, on a worldview
where face and facework are not always assumed to be traceable to the self-
image or identity of individuals (Arundale 2009). It follows from this latter
assumption that members can perceive their group face to be threatened with-
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out this necessarily directly translating into a threat to their own individual
face as members of that group.
We propose here that this concept of collective or group face can be
extended to a notion of perceived national face. Magistro (2007, 2011), for
instance, proposes Brown & Levinson’s (1987) notion of face be extended from
Model Persons to Model Citizens in suggesting that the latter possess ‘a national
esteem, a public national image which is commensurate to the sense of reputa-
tion that they attribute to their country and that they want others to appreciate
[positive national face want] and respect [negative national face want]’ (Magis-
tro 2011: 234). However, rather than theorising national face in terms of psychol-
ogised wants as does Magistro, we propose here that it is more consistent with
a discursive stance on identity and impoliteness to theorise national face in
terms of perceptions, which are variously distributed across the individuals that
comprise a collective social or relational network (in this case a nation state).
A discursive notion of national face builds first on perceptions (or beliefs)
held amongst a particular group of individuals that they share some identifying
characteristics that distinguish their group from (members of) other groups. In
the case of cross-Strait relations such perceptions might include the belief held
by many Taiwanese citizens that Taiwanese are not (exclusively) Chinese, which
contrasts with the belief held by many citizens of Mainland China that Tai-
wanese are Chinese; represented as ‘Taiwanese think that Taiwanese are not
Chinese’ and ‘Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese are Chinese’ respectively.
At this point such perceptions involve identity claims rather than face per se.
However, in intergroup interactions concern about the perceptions of the other
group arguably become salient, in part due to the obvious political, economic
and military power differential between Mainland China and Taiwan. In inter-
group settings, then, it is not just the perceptions held by individuals them-
selves (direct perceptions) but also their perceptions of the perceptions of others
(first-order reflexive perceptions), as well as their perceptions of the perceptions
of others of their perceptions (second-order reflexive perceptions) that arguably
come to play a constitutive role in interaction.3 In the case of cross-Strait rela-
tions, first-order reflexive perceptions of national identity might include percep-
tions such as ‘Taiwanese think that Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese are
3 The distinction between direct and first/second-order reflexive perceptions draws in part
from Arundale’s (2010) discussion of the different levels of face interpreting in Face Constitut-
ing Theory (FCT). Our approach here differs, however, in that we focus on perceptions of
identity claims in intergroup contexts rather than interpretations of relational connection or
separation in interpersonal settings, although we believe our approach is not inconsistent with
that outlined in FCT.
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Chinese’ or ‘Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese think that Taiwanese are
Chinese’, while examples of second-order reflexive perceptions of national iden-
tity might include perceptions such as ‘Taiwanese think that Mainland Chinese
think that Taiwanese think that Taiwanese are Chinese’ or ‘Mainland Chinese
think that Taiwanese think that Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese are
Chinese’ and so on. It is these reflexive perceptions of national identity that
underpin our claim that intergroup relations involve not only identity concerns
but also collective face concerns. In other words, what differentiates face from
identity is first that the former always involves expectations that it be recog-
nised by others, and indeed without such (perceived) recognition there are no
grounds for making a claim to face (Haugh 2009; O’Driscoll 2011); second that
it inevitably involves reflexive perceptions of what others think of one’s group
and the like, not simply one’s perceptions of one’s own group (Arundale 2010;
Haugh & Hinze 2003); and third that it is inherently relational (Arundale 2006,
2010), among other things. This means that ultimately what distinguishes
national face from national identity is that the former is occasioned by reflexive
expectations that these identity claims be recognised by relationally significant
others, while the latter only encompasses direct perceptions of national affilia-
tion which do not depend (in an existential sense) on recognition from others.
It is worth noting, of course, that a focus on claimed national identity and
perceived national face does not preclude discussion of the interpersonal or
relational implications of such intergroup interactions (Mills & Kádár 2011).
Obviously, when discussing CMC differences between Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese it would be misleading to describe national identity and face-related
conflicts as clashes between two massive online communities. Such a claim is
all the more erroneous because while it is possible to observe certain rhetorical
patterns in conflict, it is impossible to systematically describe the myriads of
the differences among individual manifestations of behaviour. It is more pro-
ductive in the ultimate analysis, we believe, to treat concerns for ‘group’ and
‘individual’ face not as dichotomous, but rather as dynamic, inter-related
dimensions of an inclusive notion of face that is fundamentally relational in
nature (Arundale 2009, 2010), although space precludes us here from develop-
ing such a line of argument further.4 In any case, while we make passing refer-
ence to the interpersonal concerns in our latter analysis, our focus in this paper
is primarily on issues of national identity and perceived national face in online
discussion boards, and it is to these issues that we now turn.
4 We are not claiming here that these different aspects of face are necessarily hierarchically
ordered. Whether one or the other takes precedence is entirely a matter of locally situated
contingencies.
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3 Data and methodology
The data in this study are drawn from two main sources: (1) web-based text
written by Mainland Chinese or Taiwanese accessible via general search
engines, and (2) online discussion boards frequented by Mainland Chinese and
Taiwanese users. We used these sources in an interdependent way in the course
of the following three steps:
1. Search of online discussion boards to identify the most popular abusive
forms of address/reference.
2. General web search to examine the relative frequency of these forms.
3. A discursive exploration of discussion boards, in order to better under-
stand the localised usages of these forms in online interactions (and/or
the reason behind their non-occurrence in some instances).
The analysis of abusive terms in the present research is based on the concept
of word frequency (Yates 1996). In the initial phase of the present research we
set out to examine Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese use of terms that insult or
threaten the other group. After making a selection of the most salient abusive
terms used by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese on discussion boards, we nar-
rowed the list down to fifteen forms of address/reference that were frequently
used in online settings.
We next studied frequency of these expressions through a general search
of online texts written by Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese. It might have been
fruitful to limit the analysis to vocative cases in discussion boards only. How-
ever, online Sino-Taiwanese aggression discourse often takes place in intra-
group rather than intergroup settings, and in various modes of CMC. That is,
in many cases the Chinese and the Taiwanese interact only with their fellow
countrymen and women, and they refer to rather than address people from
the other side. While in such interactions aggression is always present at least
potentially, such aggression would be labelled in psychology as indirect rather
than direct (e.g. Hess & Hagen 2006). Since indirect aggression is more frequent
than its direct counterpart, studying referential cases helped us to overview the
types and frequency of abusive language use in China and Taiwan in relation
to the other side. It is worth noting that when analysing discursive behaviour
we analysed manifestations of direct aggression only, since we were ultimately
interested in how such terms are used in intergroup interactions.
We only analysed cursing terms in which either ‘China’ (Dalu 大陸 ‘Main-
land China’) or ‘Taiwan’ (or other references to the countries) occurred, in the
compound form ‘China/Taiwan + X’ and ‘Taiwan + X’. There are in fact two
different official designations for China, namely the aforementioned Dalu and
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the official form Zhongguo (中國). Forms containing the latter (e.g. Zhongguo-
gou中國狗 ‘Chinese dog’) were excluded from the analysis because while ‘Main-
land’ (Dalu) is inherently ‘exclusive’ (i.e. ‘Mainland’ ≠ ‘Taiwan’ and other over-
seas Chinese communities), Zhongguo is ‘inclusive’ in that in certain ideological
contexts it can refer to Taiwan as part of China; for instance, Zhongguo-gou
(‘Chinese dog’) can refer to Taiwanese in certain contexts. There were also some
‘ambivalent’ terms that we excluded from the analysis such as si-hanjian死汉奸
(‘traitor of China who should die’) as they are frequently used by both Mainland
Chinese and Taiwanese. For example, while si-hanjian is mostly used by Main-
land Chinese to abuse Taiwanese, in some cases it is also used by the Tai-
wanese. Finally, we restricted our research to forms that originate in standard
Chinese; e.g. ‘426’ is not counted in spite of the fact that it is fairly common in
online discourse.5
After identifying fifteen abusive forms of address/reference, we conducted
Google searches in order to observe their relative frequency. In what follows we
outline how we constrained this lexical search with reference to Dalu-gou
大陸狗 (‘Mainland Chinese dog’), a common abusive form of address/reference
used by Taiwanese:
– Imputed “大陸狗” (in quotation marks): 89,100 hits;
– Refined the search by inserting ‘Taiwan’ (‘臺灣’) and -Singapore (-新加坡),
-Hong Kong (-香港), -Malaysia (-馬來西亞), etc., in order to ensure that
the retrieved data only reflects Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese hits (in
other overseas Chinese communities, including notably Hong Kong, there
is also a prevailing anti-Chinese political discourse, see Matthews et al.
2008: 171);
– Excluded compound forms in which the use of ‘Mainland Chinese dog’
could be non-abusive, e.g. -pet (-宠物), -veterinary (-医师),
-dog meat (-肉), -dog species (-犬);
– Excluded cases where an abusive form occurred in reference to the other
side’s verbal abusive behaviour, that is, in situations when Chinese post-
ers intend to generate anti-Taiwanese sentiments or vice versa. This was
done simply by limiting our Google search to either traditional (Tai-
wanese) or simplified (Mainland Chinese) fonts. Considering that empiri-
cal research shows that few Taiwanese use simplified fonts and perhaps
5 426 refers to Mainland Chinese as in Taiwanese (Minnan閩南); its pronunciation is close to
si-alu死阿陸 ‘Mainlander to be killed’. From a cultural perspective this is a noteworthy expres-
sion: 426 is originally an ‘unlucky number’ (in Chinese, number 4 is unlucky, and in 426, 4
becomes significant as it is a middle value between 2 and 6), and so this negative meaning
further increases 426’s abusive value.
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even less Mainlanders use simplified ones, excluding abusive terms where
the font is different to that of the surrounding text is likely to remove Tai-
wanese metapragmatic discourse on Chinese abusive language use, and
vice versa, from the analysis. In other words, Taiwanese users of abusive
terms were identified through their use of traditional Chinese characters,
while Mainland users were identified through their use of simplified Chi-
nese characters.
– Excluded cases in which the poster’s/author’s national identity cannot be
defined with certainty. Although in the majority of the cases the ortho-
graphic method discussed above also helped us to ascertain whether the
user was from Taiwan or Mainland China, there were a few scattered
exceptions to this trend. For example, as we shall see in the case of
extract (1) below, some educated Chinese users intentionally use tradi-
tional characters as a form of (potentially mock) association with the Tai-
wanese. Due to this, if there was any doubt with regards to the national
identity of a user – that is, in cases in which this was not clear from the
given utterance – we attempted to manually analyse textual and contex-
tual clues.
– Manually checked the remaining hits to ascertain whether they in fact
reflect Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese conflict; this final search resulted
in roughly 53,600 hits.
While this lexical research is not fully precise in the sense that Google only
retrieves estimated results, and is not necessarily always reliable, it does argua-
bly reveal broad quantitative trends in the usage of such terms between Main-
land Chinese and Taiwanese. While the recall rate of search engines is much
debated (e.g. Zhu & Dreher 2008), through our manual check we were able to
establish at least a centimal precision rate (see also section 4). In any case, our
focus was on the relative occurrence of these terms in Mainland Chinese versus
Taiwanese online text, not absolute frequencies.
This lexical frequency analysis was followed by a discursive analysis of
threads from online discussion boards containing instances of such terms. Mes-
sages posted to discussion boards are asynchronous and persistent, which
means that multiple participants can view and respond to a single message or
post. Discussion boards also provide for two-way anonymous message trans-
mission, which makes them a potential hotbed for conflict since anonymity can
lead to an increase in conflictive behaviour in online settings (Ishii 2010). The
possibility of quoting in discussion boards also aids conflict because by repeat-
edly quoting a flaming message it is easier to keep the conflict active. The data
studied exhibit considerable diversity with regard to various ‘situation factors’
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(Herring 2007), including ‘participant characteristics’, ‘purpose’ and ‘activity’,
which all differ to some extent across these online discussion boards. For exam-
ple, in certain online communities abusive terms are used considerably more
frequently than in others. However, since we are focusing on threats to per-
ceived national face, such variation was backgrounded in the collection of data,
with the focus being mainly on ensuring the ‘topic’ and ‘tone’ of the discussion
boards examined were relatively homogenous.
In undertaking more detailed qualitative analyses of threads at random
from the online discussion boards, we followed Herring’s (2007) ‘by theme’
approach, that is, we selected topically interesting threads, namely, where there
was metapragmatic discussion of Sino-Taiwanese relations, and then analysed
every message in a given thread. The data collected include roughly 30,000
Chinese characters.6 In order to understand the relative size of this dataset, it
is pertinent to note that Chinese words are mostly constituted from one to three
characters.
4 Abusive terms in online discussion boards
The present section first overviews the results of the quantitative analysis of
the relative frequency of a number of abusive terms and then discusses the
implications of these findings. As the present study aims at broad quantitative
trends, with a particular focus on their relative frequency amongst Mainland
Chinese and Taiwanese users, numbers in the tables are given in centimal. That
is, in the course of this analysis we intentionally rounded numbers to the near-
est 100: numbers which end as 50 or below are rounded below, and numbers
from 51 are rounded above. This approach seems to be particularly reasonable
given the previously discussed issues with regard to the recall rate of search
engines, and also given our focus on relative rather than absolute frequency of
occurrence.
4.1 Frequency of occurrence abusive terms
Animal metaphors – most importantly ‘pig’ and ‘dog’ – were the most fre-
quently used vocative forms of abuse, which is consistent with norms of Chi-
nese rudeness in the political arena (Kuo 2003). The results of this lexical analy-
6 Since these texts include alphabetical letters, emoticons and other forms, this figure is only
a rough estimation.
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Term Estimated frequency
1. Dalu-gou 大陸狗 (‘Mainland China dog’) 32,500
2. Dalu-zhu 大陸豬 (‘Mainland Chinese pig’) 6,700
3. Dalu-gui(zi) 大陸鬼(子) (‘Mainland Chinese devil’) 12,200
4. Tai(wan)-gou 台(湾)狗 (‘Taiwanese dog’) 12,900
5. Tai(wan)-zhu 台(湾)猪 (‘Taiwanese pig’) 7,100
6. Tai(wan)-gui(zi) 台(湾) 鬼(子) (‘Taiwanese devil’) 2,500
Table 1: ‘Dog/pig/devil’ group.
sis are illustrated in the tables in this section, which introduce terms in pairs,
i.e. the Chinese and Taiwanese terms of abuse are represented in semantic pairs
(where available).
The first group includes a common group of compound terms – ‘Mainland
China/Taiwan + dog/pig/devil’ forms – which are used by both Mainland Chi-
nese and Taiwanese users. Equating the enemy with a dog (gou), pig (zhu) or
devil (gui) is a traditional practice in Chinese (Kádár 2007), so these forms can
be regarded as standard manifestations of abusive terms. In terms of their rela-
tive proportion, the Taiwanese seem to use these abusive terms more frequently
than vice versa, although it is pertinent to note that Tai(wan)-zhu ‘Taiwanese
pig’ occurs slightly more frequently than Dalu-zhu ‘Mainland Chinese pig’. In
sum, there are 51,400 estimated occurrences of terms derogating Mainland Chi-
nese, while there are only 22,500 occurrences of terms involving derogation of
Taiwanese.
It should be noted that the dog/pig/devil-forms show some variation: ‘Tai-
wan + X’ often occurs in the abbreviated ‘Tai + X’ form. Furthermore, in some
cases gui ‘devil’ is combined with the nominal suffix zi 子 as in guizi. Gui vs.
guizi are not necessarily interchangeable: guizi has connotations of more
archaic usage, that is, Taiwan-guizi and Dalu-guizi occur more frequently in
historical contexts.
A second group of abusive forms of address/reference are those that include
‘excrement’, i.e. fen(fen) 糞(糞) and shi 屎.7 In a similar way to the abusive
terms in the previous groups, these expressions have historical predecessors
(Kádár 2007), that is, equating the enemy with excrement is a traditional Chi-
nese discursive practice. However, unlike the previous ‘dog/pig/devil-group’,
these terms are rarely used in online texts. The rate of occurrence of Mainland
Chinese and Taiwanese-related excrement terms is roughly equivalent to that
7 Fen frequently occurs in a reduplicated form as well, although single and reduplicated vari-
ants seem to convey similar meanings.
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Term Estimated frequency
7. Dalu-fen(fen) 大陸糞(糞) (‘Mainland China excrement’) 1,400
8. Dalu-shi 大陸屎 (‘Mainland Chinese excrement’) 500
9. Tai(wan)-fen(fen) 台湾粪(粪) (‘Taiwan excrement’) 400
10. Tai(wan)-shi 台(湾)屎 (‘Taiwanese excrement’) 100
Table 2: Excrement-group.
Term Estimated frequency
11. Zhina-zhu 支那豬 (‘China pig’) 154,500
12. Zhina-gou 支那狗 (‘China dog’) 15,700
13. Zhina-gui 支那鬼 (‘China dog’) 2,300
Table 3: Shina-group.
of the ‘dog/pig/devil-group’, i.e. the Taiwanese seem to use these terms more
frequently than the Mainland Chinese.
A third group of frequently occurring abusive terms of address/reference
used by Taiwanese in online CMC discussion boards is what have we defined
as the ‘Shina-group’. ‘Shina’ 支那 (‘Zhina’ in Chinese), transliterated from San-
skrit, is a nationalistic term of contempt used in reference to Mainland China,
which was widely used by the Japanese until the end of WWII (Fogel 1991). As
Japanese was the official language in Taiwan until the handover of Taiwan to
the Republic of China in 1945, in Taiwanese Mandarin ‘Shina + X’ loanword
forms became a widespread form to express contempt for the Mainland Chi-
nese.8 The popularity of these forms is explained by Taiwan’s historical ties to
Japan due to being a part of Japan for fifty years (1895–1945): in Taiwan there
is a prevalent discourse on the cultural similarity between Japan and Taiwan
at the cost of ‘Chineseness’ (Lam 2004), and this claim of cultural closeness
manifests itself also in the use of ‘Shina-terms’.
Finally, there are two further abusive forms that have no equivalents. The
first one, Tai-8-zi台8子 (‘Taiwanese bastard’), is a noteworthy form in that it is
the only internet-specific term among the frequently used terms of abuse in our
dataset. 8-zi is a form of numeral slang for bazi八字 (‘bastard’), and as such is
8 It can be claimed that the three ‘Shina-forms’ are loanwords and not Taiwanese creations
because all of these forms occur in historical Japanese texts (e.g. Shina-no-inoko 支那猪子 for
the contemporary Taiwanese Zhina-zhu), and also a check of current use on the internet reveals
that these forms also occur on contemporary Japanese websites.
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Term Estimated frequency
14. Tai-8-zi 台8子 (‘Taiwanese bastard’) 8,100
15. Si-a’gong 死阿共 (‘Commie to be killed’) 29,900
Table 4: ‘Taiwanese bastard’.
an interesting manifestation of so-called net-language (Crystal 2000: 34). Si-
a’gong死阿共 (‘Commie to be killed’) is a militant form of reference to Mainland
Chinese, and it seems to be frequently used by not only Taiwanese Chinese but
also by Hong Kong users, although in the present study only use of the term
by Taiwanese was included in the final count.
4.2 Implications
Quantitative research into the frequency of abusive terms suggests that the
Mainland Chinese use abusive terms much less frequently than the Taiwanese
users. There were 255,700 China-directed abusive forms, but only 31,200 occur-
rences of Taiwan-directed abusive forms. In other words, abusive terms were
directed at the Mainland Chinese eight times more frequently than at the Tai-
wanese. One could argue that this difference is due to the fact that we cannot
hear the voice of Mainland Chinese online. However, if we look into statistical
data, it becomes evident that this is not the case. As recent data show, Taiwan
has a very high internet penetration rate (70.1 percent), with an estimated
16,130,000 users. China has a considerably lower internet penetration rate (34.4
percent), but the number of Chinese internet users is estimated to be up to
457,000,000.9 As was already noted in the introduction, internet censorship
does not influence Mainland Chinese discussions about Taiwanese issues. Fur-
thermore, in light of the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to maintain
anti-Taiwanese rhetoric both in the media and in online settings (Kalathil &
Boas 2003), it seems unlikely that the Chinese authorities would censor displays
of verbal aggression by Mainland Chinese towards Taiwanese, particularly in
discussions of nationhood and national identity. The question thus remains as
to why the Mainland Chinese do not use abusive terms as frequently as Tai-
wanese users.
In order to examine this further, we hypothesised that the use of pan-Chi-
nese terms of reference by Mainland Chinese constitutes an associative identity
9 Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm.
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practice, as it implicitly asserts sovereignty over the Taiwanese. Following an
analytic methodology similar to the one used in estimating the frequency of
abusive terms in online discussion boards, we searched for forms of address/
reference that are typically used in pan-Chinese nationalistic discourse, includ-
ing:
– Taiwan tongbaomen 台湾同胞们 ‘Taiwanese compatriots’
– Dalu tongbaomen 大陸同胞們 ‘Mainland Chinese compatriots’
– Taiwan xiongdimen 台湾兄弟们 ‘Taiwanese brothers’
– Dalu xiongdimen 大陸兄弟們 ‘Mainland Chinese brothers’
– Taiwan pengyoumen 台湾朋友们 ‘Mainland Chinese friends’
– Dalu pengyoumen 大陸朋友們 ‘Mainland Chinese friends’
We searched the online occurrence of these expressions by excluding cases
where they refer to fellow countrymen, by adding ‘+大陸’ (China) to Taiwanese
expressions, and ‘+台湾’ (Taiwan) to Chinese expressions, and the plural voca-
tive pronoun (nimen你們) to the search. We also refined the search by browsing
only Mainland Chinese websites for Taiwan-specific terms of association, and
vice versa for Taiwanese terms. The frequency of occurrence of these terms after
this search is shown in table 5 below:
Term Estimated frequency
1. Taiwan tongbaomen 台湾同胞们 ‘Taiwanese compatriots’ 730,200
2. Dalu tongbaomen 大陸同胞們 ‘Mainland Chinese compatriots’ 92,100
3. Taiwan xiongdimen 台湾兄弟们 ‘Taiwanese brothers’ 45,200
4. Dalu xiongdimen 大陸兄弟們 ‘Mainland Chinese brothers’ 700
5. Taiwan pengyoumen 台湾朋友们 ‘Mainland Chinese friends’ 573,800
6. Dalu pengyoumen 大陸朋友們 ‘Mainland Chinese friends’ 132,500
Table 5: Terms of nationalisric association.
The frequency of these pan-Chinese terms in relation to Mainland Chinese
and Taiwanese in online discussion boards is markedly different and contrasts
directly with the occurrence of abusive terms. While there were 1,349,200 esti-
mated occurrences of pan-Chinese terms used in reference to Taiwan(ese), there
were only 225,300 occurrences of pan-Chinese terms used in reference to Main-
land Chinese. We have no means of ascertaining how many of these terms
occurred in aggressive contexts, but their overall difference in frequency illus-
trates that amongst Mainland Chinese users they are considerably more com-
mon (up to six times more) than amongst Taiwanese users. In what follows, we
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closely examine threads from three different online discussion boards to illus-
trate the way in which Taiwanese users respond to these forms with overt or
covert aggression, which, we will suggest, indicates that the Taiwanese users
evaluate pan-Chinese terms of reference as threatening to their perceived
national face.
5 Perceived national face threats in online
discussion boards
In the course of analysing threads in our sample dataset of 30,000 characters
we uncovered a general trend for associative forms used by Chinese to occasion
both overt verbal abuse and covert forms of abuse in the form of ‘mock polite-
ness’ or sarcasm on the part of Taiwanese users. We identified 124 such interac-
tions where the Taiwanese users appeared to evaluate forms of nationalistic
association as offensive.10 In the following excerpt taken from a large online
discussion board covering a wide range of issues, the use of an associative term
(Taiwan tongbaomen) by a Mainland Chinese user elicited both covert and overt
forms of verbal abuse from Taiwanese users:
(1) 埃及醒了，台湾同胞们呢？？？？？
Post 1 (xxphone 發表於 2011-2-19 02:40 PM):
大陸是一黨專政，台灣人嗤之以鼻。台灣民主執政，
可實際狀況也好不到哪去。[…]
Post 2 (qaz3wsxqaz3wsx 發表於 2011-2-19 02:48 PM):
我只想問
台灣人醒不醒干你們中共人民什關西? […]
Post 8 (padypc 發表於 2011-2-19 05:11 PM):
貴國是否甦醒是取決於貴國人民的智慧 […]
Post 10 (CVB151 發表於 2011-2-19 05:28 PM):
[…] 我們台灣同胞本來就是醒的，你們在中共統治下才要醒醒。[…]
‘Egypt revolted – what will our Taiwanese compatriots do? ? ? ? ?
Post 1 (xxphone):
10 Since this analysis is based on sampled data there are no claims, of course, that it is
definitive, and the hypothesis we form here awaits testing in larger datasets.
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Mainland China is a one party dictatorship, and the Taiwanese give it a
snort of contempt. Taiwan is a democratic country, but in reality democ-
racy is good for nothing
Post 2 (qaz3wsxqaz3wsx):
I would only like to ask
What on earth do you Communists have to do with whether Taiwan has
revolted or not?
Post 8 (padypc):
Whether your precious country will revolt or not depends on your pre-
cious country’s intelligence
Post 10 (CVB151):
We Taiwanese compatriots have already revolted; you are the ones who
should revolt against the Chinese Communist Party’
(Source: http://www.eyny.com/archiver/tid-5963376.html)
This interaction represents an open challenge to Taiwanese by a Mainland Chi-
nese user, ‘xxphone’, who appears to be aiming to flame a discussion by calling
on Taiwanese Chinese to ‘revolt’ like the anti-Mubarak protesters against their
government, as well as by describing Taiwanese democracy in negative terms
(post 1).
Interestingly, the first Taiwanese responder, ‘qaz3wsxqaz3wsx’, focuses pri-
marily on disputing the claimed Sino-Taiwanese relationship and not the other
potentially offensive claims in post 2. That is, it seems that xxphone’s use of
the term Taiwan tongbaomen (‘Taiwanese compatriots’) is treated as the most
salient offence in this interaction. The term tongbaomen here refers to both
Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese (i.e. it is inclusive). It thus constitutes an
instance of an associative identity practice, although it is open to question
whether this was meant ironically or not considering the dissociative implica-
tions of the remainder of xxphone’s post.
However, this ironic reading of Taiwan tongbaomen does not appear to have
been picked up on by the subsequent respondents, as the next few Taiwanese
responders also react in a hostile manner to the question of whether Taiwan
should revolt while they continue to maintain qaz3wsxqaz3wsx’s rejection of
Sino-Taiwanese association using terms such as bieren-de-guojia 別人的國家
(‘other countries’), which implicitly assert Taiwan’s independence from Main-
land China (data not cited). The wish to dissociate national identities becomes
even more marked when the Taiwanese poster ‘padypc’ uses the honorific form
guiguo 貴國 ‘your precious country’ to refer to China (post 8). As argued in
 - 10.1515/multi-2013-0016
Downloaded from PubFactory at 07/25/2016 03:23:44AM
via University of Queensland - UQ Library
DE GRUYTER MOUTON Aggression and perceived national face threats 361
Kádár (2007), forms like guiguo are used in Chinese diplomacy in order to ele-
vate other countries, and so in the present context this honorific form of refer-
ence presupposes dissociation between Taiwan and Mainland China. Through
such marked deference the poster is able to convey sarcasm and contempt for
the position of Mainland Chinese with regard to national identity, and so the
post is open evaluation as a form of ‘mock politeness’ (Culpeper 1996, 2011).
This utterance is soon followed by another dissociative practice when a Tai-
wanese poster ‘CVB151’ reinterprets tongbao ‘compatriot’ (post 10): he refers to
the Taiwanese group as ‘we Taiwanese compatriots’ and to the Chinese as ‘you’.
By using tongbao as an in-group (i.e. Taiwanese) self-reference and referring to
the Chinese as ‘you’, CVB151 makes it clear that the Chinese do not belong to
his group of tongbao (‘compatriots’).
The Mainland Chinese poster’s claim to a pan-Chinese national identity
through the use of Taiwan tongbaomen (‘Taiwanese compatriots’) is interpreted
by these respondents as neglecting the Taiwanese claim to a separate national
identity. This occasions a threat to the perceived national face of the Taiwanese
users, as it potentially generates reflexive perceptions on the part of the Tai-
wanese users that Mainland Chinese think that Taiwanese are Chinese (first-
order reflexive perception). It further generates the perception on the part of
the Taiwanese users that the Mainland Chinese think the Taiwanese think that
Taiwanese are Chinese (second-order reflexive perception). Since how the Tai-
wanese users perceive the Mainland Chinese to perceive them is not in accord-
ance with their national identity claim, namely, that Taiwanese are not (exclu-
sively) Chinese, these reflexive perceptions can be evaluated as threatening to
their perceived national face.
It is interesting to note that the Taiwanese reaction in this thread is a typical
one, as can be shown with reference to metapragmatic discourse on the use of
tongbaomen (‘compatriots’) by Mainland Chinese when used in reference to
Taiwanese. For instance, in 2008, a Sino-Taiwanese discussion occurred on an
online discussion board under the title Weishenme zai Taiwanren mianqian
chenghu duifang wei tongbao jiu name lingren taoyan 为什么在台湾人面
前称呼对方为同胞就那么令对方讨厌 (‘Why do the Taiwanese dislike it if they
are called “compatriots”?’).11 In this discussion, which took place on the open-
access Mainland Chinese Tianya 天涯 bulletin board, the vast majority of Tai-
wanese posters strongly refused to be described as tongbao, making a wide
variety of linguistic and political arguments about the impropriety of this
expression in Sino-Taiwanese relationships.
11 Source: http://bbs.city.tianya.cn/tianyacity/Content/333/1/15082.shtml.
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In what follows, we examine two further case studies from CMC discussion
boards, in which there is evidence that the associative implications of tongbao
were interpreted as offensive by Taiwanese posters, in spite of the fact that
the Mainland Chinese posts were ostensibly ‘polite’. Such cases are noteworthy
because they further illustrate that associative identity practices are open to
be evaluated as rude or offensive in the context of intergroup Sino-Taiwanese
interactions:
(2) 哎，台湾同胞们，让你们见笑了
Post 1 (221.221.217.* 2009-02-11 01:34):
来到这个吧，才知道
台湾人为什么讨厌中国人
看到那么多中国人的帖子
我实在是无语了
面对真相，他们就是不相信
反而用低俗愚蠢的话语攻击你们
请你们多多包涵了，
不过不是每个中国人都是处在愚昧无知中的
只不过我们也没能力没办法，
想想如果你们生在中国
对吗？
Post 2 (兔兔 2009-02-11 01:38):
楼主：
谁是你同胞啊？
你是支那猪，台湾人是台湾人。
少来花花肠子了。
Post 3 (151.80.235.* 2009-02-11 04:54):
兔兔也真的不用这么绝情呢,多一个朋友要比多一个敌人要要好..
大陆人是值得我们同情的...............即使敌人也需要我们的同情,,,,
他们是共产党的牺牲品.........我们生活在自由世界的人.
怎么可以和他们计较呢
‘Ah, Taiwanese compatriots, we ridiculed you.
Post 1 (221.221.217.*):
Only when I visited this discussion board did I realise
why the Taiwanese hate the Chinese
Seeing so many Chinese posts
I lost my word
In fact, these Chinese posters don’t trust [you]
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and they use nasty words to bully you
Please be so kind to forgive us
in fact not every Chinese is as ignorant as those posters are
we can’t do anything against this,
Imagine if you were born in China [like them]
Right?
Post 2 (Tutu):
Who is your compatriot?
You are Sina-pigs and the Taiwanese are Taiwanese.
Refrain from using cunning words.
Post 3 (51.80.235.*):
Tutu, you don’t need to be so cruel, it is better to make friends than
enemies..
Mainlanders deserve our sympathy ............... even the enemy deserves
our sympathy ,,,,
They are the victims of the Communist Party, while we are living in a
free world. Why would it make sense to dispute things with them?’
(Source: http://www.ipobar.com/read.php?tid-49099.html#appear)
This interaction took place in the politics section of a large Taiwanese online
discussion board that was accessed by a Mainland Chinese poster
(‘221.221.217.*’). The thread above begins with a collective apology by
221.221.217.* for the behaviour of other Mainland Chinese users who are critical
and aggressive towards Taiwanese in many postings. 221.221.217.*’s pragmatic
act is apparently ‘polite’ from the perspective of a traditional Brown &
Levinsonian (1987) interpretation: apart from the apology itself, 221.221.217.*
makes use of different formulaic expressions of politeness such as deferential
request (qing 请 ‘please’), a formal expression of apology (duoduo-baohan
多多包涵 ‘kindly forgive us’), and denigrating terms in reference to Mainland
Chinese (yumei-wuzhi愚昧无知 ‘be stupid and ignorant’) (post 1). However, the
next poster ‘Tutu’ reacts to this apology in an aggressive way: Tutu criticises
221.221.217.* for calling Taiwanese tongbao ‘compatriot’ by first posting a
rhetorical question, ‘Who is your compatriot?’, which implies rejection of the
inclusive connotations of tongbao (post 2). Tutu further describes the ostensibly
polite post as an instance of huahua-changzi 花花肠子 (‘cunning words’), as
well as invoking the abusive referential form Zhina-zhu (‘Shina-pig’).
This negative evaluation of 221.221.217.*’s initial post is reiterated by the
next poster, ‘51.80.235.*’, who is more covertly aggressive in contrast to Tutu.
In post 3 the user pretends to admonish Tutu for responding in such a harsh
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way to 221.221.217.*’s post, and also expresses sympathy towards the Mainland
Chinese. However, this user formulates the post in an ironic way, as s/he refers
to the Mainland Chinese as the ‘enemy’ (diren 敌人), and it thus appears to be
another instance of ‘mock politeness’ (Culpeper 1996, 2011). In this way, the
third post reinforces the second poster’s attempt to dissociate Taiwanese from
Mainland Chinese.
Once again we suggest that what occasions these overt and covert displays
of aggression on the part of the Taiwanese users is the threat to their perceived
national face that the use of inclusive, pan-Chinese terms represents.12 The
interaction above illustrates that the use of such terms by Mainland Chinese
are often evaluated as aggressive, sometimes even independently of the poster’s
putative intention to be polite. The next interaction – in which Chinese and
Taiwanese posters meet in a relatively apolitical context – further illustrates the
national face-threatening potential of such expressions of association:
(3) 台湾同胞们，请看帖子！
Post 1 (疯狂海军 07/19/2010 02:30:25):
本是同根生，相煎何太急！
各位台灣同胞！請你體諒我們大陸玩家！我們視你們為兄弟姐妹，
你們何故要傷害我們呢？
不說政治的話題，說說歷史！你知道在遙遠的歷史我們本是一個祖先？
我們都是炎黃的子孫後代！為何不團結一起呢？高麗棒子在我們教訓他們，
但是他們分開了何必要重言自己的同胞們呢？我們都是一家人，從過去到
現在都是！我們要團結不能被外人的搗鼓導致我們的分裂！~台灣的兄弟
姐們！我們永遠都是一家人！
以後可不能因為一點小事就這樣惡言傷人了！团结一致、共同游戏！
Post 2 (Zart 1. 07/19/2010 09:25:56):
第一.
兩岸只有文化根基相同,長期的隔離與發展後,
我們不覺得跟你們是什麼所謂的兄弟姐妹,
更別提貴國政府與人民經常性的擺出侵略性、 攻擊性的態度 […]
所以拜託什麼認親大會請先去非洲谷地辦吧 ... 請認清國際現實
第二.
懇請兩岸問題與種族問題請勿一再拿到 battle.net 這類中立區域來討戰,
這會造成 BZ 管理員的困擾 […] 這裡是遊戲版面 ...
12 It remains an open question whether the original post was intended straightforwardly as a
‘polite’ apology or whether this ‘polite’ packaging in fact was also a covert form of aggression,
the so-called ‘velvet glove’ noted by Watts (1992), where aggression is masked by ostensibly
polite formulations.
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Post 3 (Deltablue 2. 07/29/2010 07:14:29):
[本是同根生] [各位台灣同胞] [本是一個祖先] [都是炎黃的子孫]
[我們都是一家人， 從過去到現在都是]
在我看來全部是[文化侵略]
我們不希望在遊戲上談論 [政治] [兩國(岸)關係] 這種 [文化侵略]
也別來了 好嗎??
‘Taiwanese compatriots, please read this post!
Post 1 (Fengkuang Haijun [Insane Navy]):
We have the same national roots, so why we should shoot at each other
so quickly?
All Taiwanese compatriots! Please forgive us Mainland Chinese players!
We are your brothers and sisters, why should you harm us? This is
nothing to do with politics, it is all about history! Don’t we have the
same ancestors? We are the descendants of the Mythical Emperors! Why
don’t we unite? Let us give a lesson to those [South] Korean hoodlums
who cannot unite with their compatriots [i.e. North Koreans]. We are
members of the same family, from ancient times until the present. We
should unite and not let outsiders divide us! ~ Taiwanese brothers and
sisters! We will always be a family! From now on we should not insult
each other because of small matters. Let us unite and play together!
Post 2 (Zart 1):
Firstly: The two sides of the Taiwan Strait only have cultural relationship.
We have been separated and developed separately for a long period, and
this is why we don’t feel that we are your so-called “brothers or sisters”,
not mentioning that your precious country and its citizens often display
aggressiveness and hostility […]
Therefore, if you wish to seek relational cords, we pray you to proceed
to the wilderness of Africa to do this [in a maximum of isolation] …
Please don’t be naïve about international relationships.
Secondly: I earnestly request you not to bring cross-Strait issues and
ethnicity ever after into Battle.net’s neutral discussion of war matters, as
this may disturb BZ [i.e. Battle Zone] moderators. […] This is a game
discussion forum.
Post 3 (Deltablue 2.):
‘Have the same national roots’, ‘all Taiwanese compatriots’, ‘have the
same ancestors’, ‘the descendants of the Mythical Emperors’, ‘we are
members of the same family, from ancient times until present’
In my view these are all terms of ‘cultural aggression’.
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Keep out ‘politics’ and ‘cross-Strait’ and all this kind of ‘cultural
aggression’ from our game, will you?’
(Source: http://forums.battle.net/thread.html?topicId=25969523700
andsid=5021)
This interaction took place on a thread on the online game ‘battle.net’s’
discussion board relating to the simulated battle ‘Decisive Battle for the
Senkaku Islands’ (juezhan Diaoyutai 決戰釣魚台), which is an island chain
claimed by Taiwan, Japan and Mainland China. Importantly, while battle.net is
a multilingual and multicultural game website and is officially politics-free,
players sometimes do discuss real political matters on the discussion board on
this website, although ‘hostilities’ do not generally stir metapragmatic debates
or generate wider attention.
Here, Fengkuang Haijun’s call to Taiwanese players – that is to ‘unite forces’
with Mainland Chinese players both in the game and in discussions relating to
game – seems to be spontaneous. Fengkuang Haijun claims his post has
‘nothing to do with politics’ (bu shuo zhengzhi de huati 不說政治的話題), and
he also attempts to ‘give face’ to Taiwanese players/posters by performing a
collective apology (in a similar way to the first post on the previous thread) on
behalf of Mainland Chinese (Glinert 2010). However, his posting is received in
an extremely critical way by other players. Altogether six players responded to
this post, with all six being critical (although due to space constraints we only
cite two responses). In the first response by ‘Zart’ (post 2), the term xiongdi-
jiemei 兄弟姐妹 ‘elder and younger brothers and sisters’ is rejected, similar to
Tutu’s rejection of tongbao in example (2). He also projects dissociation by not
only explicitly rejecting a close Sino-Taiwanese relationship (‘if you wish to
seek relational cords, we pray you to proceed to the wilderness of Africa to do
this [in a maximum of isolation]’), but also by using the honorific form of
address guiguo (‘your precious country’). He also projects relational distance
from Fengkuang Haijun by using a wide variety of deferential forms such as
baituo 拜託 (‘pray you’). In this sense, he seems to follow the same pattern as
‘padypc’ in example (1) and ‘51.80.235*’ in example (2), in projecting mock
politeness, since the use of such deferential forms is marked in an online
context where such forms occur relatively infrequently. Zart’s post is followed
by one from ‘Deltablue’, who evaluates Fengkuang Haijun’s attempts to project
association as a form of ‘cultural aggression’ (wenhua-qinlüe 文化侵略) (post
3).
In sum, these threads illustrate that in Sino-Taiwanese interactions the
Mainland Chinese users do not necessarily need to use explicitly abusive terms
in order to be perceived as projecting threats to the perceived national face of
 - 10.1515/multi-2013-0016
Downloaded from PubFactory at 07/25/2016 03:23:44AM
via University of Queensland - UQ Library
DE GRUYTER MOUTON Aggression and perceived national face threats 367
Taiwanese users. This threat arises from (reflexive) perceptions on the part of
the Taiwanese users that the Mainland Chinese users are neglecting or even
rejecting the claimed national identity of Taiwanese as not (exclusively)
Chinese.
6 Concluding remarks
The present paper has set out to examine Sino-Taiwanese use of abusive terms
in online discussion boards. Our focus has been on terms of address/reference
through which differences between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese orienta-
tions to perceived national face threats manifest themselves. Further research
thus remains to be done to explore other strategies in Sino-Taiwanese aggres-
sion discourse. One of our key findings in relation to referring expressions has
been that the Taiwanese are more likely to apply terms that openly abuse the
Mainland Chinese than vice versa. Furthermore, in Sino-Taiwanese interactions
the Mainland Chinese are more likely to use associative identity practices, such
as the ostensibly polite forms tongbaomen (‘compatriots’) or xiongdijiemei
(‘brothers and sisters’). On the other hand, the Taiwanese tend to respond with
dissociative identity practices, such as the use of abusive terms, negative meta-
pragmatic discourse on the use of such pan-Chinese forms of address/reference,
marked use of deferential forms, as well as sarcasm. We interpret this difference
to be a reflection of broader macro-discourses on national identity. The Main-
land Chinese claim that Taiwan is a part of China, and many Mainland Chinese
users reinforce this claim through the use of pan-Chinese reference terms. Con-
sidering China’s increasing global and regional dominance, the Mainland Chi-
nese assume the position of the powerful party in these interactions. The Tai-
wanese users, on the other hand, seem to prefer to dissociate their national
identity from that of Mainland Chinese, and thus respond aggressively to threats
to their perceived national face. We suggest, however, that further study in this
area is necessary to shed more light on the relationship between threats to
perceived national face in the context of intergroup settings, and interpersonal
implications for relationships between participants that arise in such interac-
tions. Our focus in this paper has been on the former, but this is not to say that
that latter is not also of considerable importance in the context of Sino-Tai-
wanese relations.
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